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Research on child custody primarily focuses on the well-being of children following divorce. We 
extend this literature by examining how the prospect of joint child custody affects marriage-
specific investment in children’s private-school education. Variation in the timing of joint-
custody reforms across states proxies for the prospect of joint child custody and provides a 
natural experiment framework with which to examine marriage-specific investment in children. 
The probability of children’s private school attendance declines by 13 percent in states that adopt 
joint-custody laws. The effects of joint-custody reform are larger in states that have property-
division laws that consistently favor one parent over the other. The results are largely robust for 
subsamples partitioned by socioeconomic status.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the first half of the 20
th
 century, courts in the U.S. typically favored mothers in child-
custody cases (Jacob 1988, Ch. 8; Brinig and Buckley 1998a).  In the 1960s, states began to 
remove the explicit preference for mothers so that a parent’s gender was no longer the basis for 
child-custody awards.  Even after the move away from maternal preference, most courts 
continued to award sole custody to mothers (Cancian and Meyer 1998).  However, several states 
made explicit provisions in their laws favoring joint custody or revealed their preference 
indirectly by ruling in favor of joint custody during the 1970s and 1980s (Brinig and Buckley 
1998a).  Citing the best interests of children as the impetus for legislative change, the majority of 
states followed with legal provisions for joint custody by the mid-1980s (Brinig and Buckley 
1998a; Cancian and Meyer 1998).  Although child-custody reform became a nation-wide 
phenomenon, the debate over joint custody’s costs and benefits was carried out by a relatively 
small group of politically active supporters with little empirical evidence to support their claims 
(Jacob 1988, Ch. 8).      
The joint-custody literature primarily focuses on the well-being of children following 
divorce.  We extend this literature by investigating whether joint-child-custody laws affect 
within-marriage investment in children.  We use variation in the timing of joint-custody reforms 
across states, with data from the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Population Censuses, to identify the effect 
of child-custody laws on married couples’ investment in children.1  Married couples with 
children who live in states that change their laws to favor joint custody between 1980 and 1990 
constitute the treatment group in a natural experiment, while those who live in states that had 
either instituted joint-custody reform before 1980 or that did not institute joint-custody reform 
before 1990 represent the comparison group. 
                                                 
1
  We use Brinig and Buckley’s (1998a) coding for the child-custody laws.  See TABLE 1.   
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The dependent variable is children’s private school attendance—a verifiable marriage-
specific investment in child quality.
2
  Although most children in the U.S. attend public school 
and private school represents only one of the many investments parents can make in child 
quality, private school has attractive features as a proxy for overall parental investment.  Because 
the financial costs of private school warrant long-run planning by parents, any observed 
differences in private school attendance resulting from joint-custody reform could be 
extrapolated to other forms of child investment. 
Analyzing the effects of child-custody reform on marital investment in children provides an 
opportunity to study the bargaining behavior of spouses.  If we assume the return on child 
investment is non-rival within marriage but rival outside of marriage, a change in custody regime 
transfers a portion of the expected return from one parent to another by altering the time spent 
with children outside of marriage.  The neutrality of an individual family member’s non-earned 
investment returns, with respect to intra-household distribution of resources, is a key aspect of 
the neoclassical model of the family (Becker 1991).  Hence, a unitary model of household 
behavior would predict no change in child investment following joint custody enactment.  
However, if child-custody reform alters the distribution of the marital surplus after divorce 
occurs, cooperative bargaining models of family behavior predict changes in married couples’ 
investment in children.
3
   
There is ample empirical evidence that changes in family laws and government programs that 
provide transfers to one spouse shape the bargaining process over the course of marriage (e.g., 
Lundberg et al. 1997; Gray 1998; Chiappori et al. 2002; Genadek et al. 2007; Stevenson 2007, 
                                                 
2
 Cáceres-Depliano (2006) and Conley and Glauber (2006) also use children’s private school attendance and 
grade retention as proxies for parental investment in child quality.  Unfortunately, our data set does not allow us to 
examine the impact of joint-custody laws on children’s grade retention. 
3
 See Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), and Rasul (2006).  See Bergstrom (1996) and 
Lundberg and Pollak (1996) for review of various family models. 
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2008; Gitter and Barham 2008; Ward-Batts 2008).  States that change the default custodial 
allocation from maternal preference to shared custody decrease (increase) the expected post-
divorce time mothers (fathers) spend with their children.  Brinig and Allen (2000) find that 
women are more likely to file for divorce based on the expectation of sole child custody, an 
indication that joint-custody reform could raise the costs of divorce for mothers.  As a result, 
joint-custody reform could place mothers in an inferior bargaining position.   
The empirical literature on intrahousehold resource allocation documents a higher rate of 
investment in or spending on children when mothers have greater bargaining power in the 
household (e.g., see Thomas 1990; Lundberg et al. 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998; Maitra 2003; 
Ward-Batts 2008).  If the reform shifts bargaining power away from mothers, who value child 
quality more on average, child investment may decline.  By contrast, the reform could provide 
additional incentive for fathers to invest in children because they stand to reap a greater portion 
of the post-divorce benefits from child investment through increased visitation rights.     
Considering property-division laws in conjunction with joint-custody reform may provide a 
clearer picture of household bargaining.  Gray (1998) suggests the effects of unilateral divorce 
laws on marital bargaining are conditional on the underlying property-division laws in place 
across states, with husbands and wives having greater bargaining power in common-law and 
community-property states, respectively.  The bargaining position of spouses is less clear in 
equitable-division states, as courts are expected to divide marital property evenly between 
spouses.  We examine marital investment in children and other assets as an outcome of spousal 
bargaining by allowing child-custody reform to have asymmetric effects across three mutually 
exclusive property-division regimes: common law, community property, and equitable division.
4
       
                                                 
4
 Gray (1998), Genadek et al. (2007), and Stevenson (2007, 2008) estimate the effects of divorce-law reforms in 
conjunction with the underlying property-division laws on labor-market outcomes.  
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We also examine the effects of joint-custody reform on marital investment in children for 
subsamples partitioned by mothers’ education, a measure of socioeconomic status (SES).  
Partitioning the sample by SES may be important for several reasons.  First, SES is likely to play 
a role in the decision for married couples to send their children to private school.  Second, the 
literature reports a positive correlation between joint-custody arrangements of divorced parents 
and SES (Seltzer 1991).  Third, married couples with varying SES have different divorce 
propensities (Weiss and Willis 1997).  Fourth, partitioning by mothers’ education provides a way 
to study power relations between spouses, as the gain in bargaining power for fathers following 
joint-custody reform could be mitigated by mothers’ education.  Fifth, joint-custody reform 
could increase the bargaining power of women in the high-SES group.  In the event of divorce, 
these women could (continue to) pursue professional careers, as fathers take a greater role in 
child care following divorce.   
While joint-custody laws were enacted to improve the well-being of children whose parents 
divorce, we find negative, unintended consequences for children of intact households.  The 
probability of children’s private school attendance declines by 13 percent in states that adopt 
joint-custody laws.  The negative effects of joint-custody reform on children’s private school 
attendance are larger in states that have property-division laws that consistently favor one parent 
over the other, an indication that parents may bargain over investment in children and other 
marital assets.  The results are largely robust for subsamples partitioned by SES.  However, 
children in the lowest-SES group are more adversely affected by joint-custody reform than those 
from higher-SES backgrounds.   
 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
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A. Legal Background 
The authority of family-court judges to exercise wider discretion and institute joint-custody 
arrangements is a relatively recent legal innovation.  Although child welfare was cited as the 
primary basis for child-custody reform, the passage of joint custody went against the widely held 
view among psychologists that sole custody was optimal (Goldstein et al. 1984).  However, 
challenges to the sole-custody standard were issued at this time on the basis that it was an 
impulsion for post-marital conflict and therefore contrary to the best interests of the child (Stack 
1976).  As a result, when most states began enacting joint-custody legislation, there was no 
consensus on the optimal custodial arrangement (Jacob 1988, Ch. 8).  
There were many underlying causes of child-custody reform.  Women’s increasing labor-
force participation and the more prominent role of men in child rearing were both key 
demographic changes that helped facilitate joint-custody reform (Jacob 1988, Ch. 8).  The 
preponderance of “dead-beat” parents (primarily fathers), who were in arrears of child-support 
payments, also generated political incentives to alter child-custody laws (Jacob 1988, Ch. 8).
5
  
Contrary to other family-law reforms, expert opinion was relatively absent and personal 
experiences were more often cited in the legislative discourse on joint custody (Jacob 1988, Ch. 
8).  Because it was difficult to show the negative consequences for children and the potential 
gains came at a low cost to the public, joint-custody reform was discussed by a small group of 
proponents and passed legislatures in relative obscurity (Jacob 1988, Ch. 8).        
A joint-custody provision relegates courts to handle only those custody disputes which 
cannot be settled privately (Buehler and Gerard 1995).  In the event that child custody must be 
                                                 
5
 Since welfare payments were a federal issue, by 1984, this political activity also included a U.S. Congress 
mandate that funds would be withheld from paychecks and federal tax returns to pay delinquent child support (Jacob 
1988, pp. 132). By simply granting greater custodial rights, joint custody could also have been a low-cost (for the 
state) incentive for noncustodial parents to pay child support. In fact, Brinig and Buckley (1998a) find a positive 
effect of joint-custody reform on child-support payments. 
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decided in court, judges have discretion to rule in favor of joint custody if it conforms to the best 
interests of the child.
6
  Depending on family-specific circumstances, joint custody can fall under 
a protocol of (i) joint legal custody in which parents share in the decisions of child upbringing 
but the child’s primary residence is with one of the parents or (ii) joint physical custody in which 
both parents share in child-rearing decisions and also share physical custody of the child.  Under 
either joint-custody settlement, courts expect divorced parents to maintain a cooperative 
relationship while raising their children.
7
  
Divorce settlements also depend on a state’s specific property-division laws.  In the event of 
divorce, courts distribute marital assets according to three property-division regimes: (i) 
equitable-division, (ii) common-law, or (iii) community property.  Equitable-division property 
laws authorize judges to divide marital property as they see fit, which generally protects the most 
damaged individual in the event of divorce (Gray 1998).  However, courts in these states are 
expected to divide property evenly.  In common-law states, the spouse who holds legal title 
receives control of the property in the event of divorce.  By contrast, community-property states 
transfer assets from the legal title holder to the other spouse. Assuming the husband is the 
breadwinner, community-property states reward the wife a larger share of the marriage-specific 
assets following divorce, while common-law property states generally reward the husband a 
larger share of the marital assets (Gray 1998).    
 
B. Child Investment in Models of Intrahousehold Distribution 
                                                 
6
 See Buehler and Gerard (1995) for a discussion of the Best Interests of the Child (BIOC) standard and how the 
standard varies by state.  
7
 Our measure of joint-custody reform includes both joint physical and legal custody arrangements.  
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Becker (1991) assumes that families pool all sources of income and maximize a common utility 
function.
8
  Becker’s model predicts that changes in the laws governing child custody and 
marriage-specific assets would have the same effect on within-family distribution regardless of 
which spouse benefits.
9
  However, Becker’s common-preference assumption may not be realistic 
in the context of child custody if a change in a state’s custody regime alters the expected value of 
child investment.
10
   
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) develop models in which 
couples bargain over the marital surplus.  Divorce represents an external threat point or outside 
option.  The key feature of these models is the role of environmental factors (e.g., laws 
governing the division of children following divorce), which determine the threat point in the 
bargaining game.
11
  A change in a state’s child-custody laws may alter the value of each spouse’s 
options outside of marriage, which could have consequences for within-marriage investment.   
Assume the return on child investment is non-rival within marriage but rival outside of 
marriage.  It follows that changes to laws which govern the allocation of child custody could 
                                                 
8
 In Becker’s framework, maximizing the family’s utility function occurs through the decision-making of a 
dominant altruist.  Becker emphasizes the importance of the marriage market in determining the distribution of 
resources within marriage.  Pollak (1985) specifies Becker’s model in the context of a two-stage bargaining game in 
which the altruist moves first and makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to household members.  The difference in Pollak’s 
and Becker’s models is the former assumes that it is not altruism but his/her bargaining position within the family 
that determines intrahousehold distribution.     
9
 The main obstacle in testing Becker's model is finding an exogenous factor that could affect the control of 
resources within families.  A number of studies use nonlabor income to test the income-pooling assumption in 
Becker's model (e.g., Thomas 1990; Schultz 1990).  Supporters of the income-pooling hypothesis typically conclude 
that nonlabor income may be endogenous, implying that observed differences in within-family distribution could be 
due to unobserved heterogeneity.  However, Lundberg et al. (1997), Attanasio and Lechene (2002), Gitter and 
Barham (2008), and Ward-Batts (2008) provide strong evidence rejecting the income-pooling assumption.   
10
 The marriage market also plays a significant role in the distribution of marital resources.  If prospective 
spouses can make costless, binding, distributional agreements, bargaining does not occur over the course of 
marriage.  However, this assumption may also be unrealistic as courts in the U.S. have been reluctant to recognize 
marital contracts specifying child custody in the event of divorce (Francesconi and Muthoo 2003). 
11
 Lundberg and Pollak (1993) contend that a within-marriage outcome is more reasonable since the costs 
associated with divorce are often high.  They assume the existence of traditional gender roles that determine internal 
threat points (e.g., sleeping on the couch, burnt toast, or “silent treatment”) in a Nash-bargaining framework, which 
have distributional and efficiency consequences.  In their separate-spheres model, there is no outside option (i.e. 
divorce), and they make no assumptions regarding the efficiency of the equilibrium outcome.  Since their model has 
no external threat point, joint-custody reform should have little impact on intrahousehold distribution.  
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alter the expected value of divorce by altering divorce costs for mothers and fathers.   Joint-
custody reform may lower divorce costs for fathers because they expect to lose less of the return 
from child investment when they expect shared-custody arrangements.  By contrast, joint-
custody reform may increase divorce costs for mothers because they expect to receive less of a 
return on child investment.  Brinig and Allen (2000) find a significant increase (decrease) in the 
propensity of women to file for divorce when they (do not) expect to receive sole child custody.  
Their results suggest that the expectation of child custody is the most important factor in 
women’s decisions to file for divorce.  In the context of a Nash-bargained outcome, these 
findings suggest joint-custody reform should unambiguously shift bargaining power to fathers, as 
the value of divorce decreases for mothers.  Hence, post-reform marital investment in children 
may reflect the preferences of fathers to a greater extent.   
Rasul (2006) develops a model of within-family bargaining in which child quality is a public 
good and married couples contract an ex ante allocation of child custody should divorce occur.
12
   
If spouses have homogenous preferences for child quality, joint custody is the optimal post-
divorce custody allocation because it maximizes investment in the public good during marriage.  
However, if spouses have heterogeneous preferences for child quality, sole custody with the 
high-valuation spouse is the optimal child-custody allocation.  If both spouses have an equally 
high valuation of child quality, we may observe a rise in the probability that a child attends 
private school when a state adopts joint custody.  Alternatively, if one spouse values child 
quality more on average, we may either observe a positive or negative impact of joint-custody 
laws on marital investment in child quality.  If bargaining power shifts to the high-valuation 
                                                 
12
  Weiss and Willis (1985, 1993) also examine the allocation of child custody in the event of divorce; however, 
they only consider sole custody as a post-divorce allocation of children.  Francesconi and Muthoo (2003) consider 
joint custody as an option and examine marital investment in chidlren.  Their paper differs from Rasul’s in several 
ways.  For example, they consider cases in which the allocation of sole child custody to the low-valuation parent is 
optimal and divorce cannot occur in their model.    
- 9 - 
 
spouse, the rate at which parents invest in private school for their children could increase. 
However, if the reform shifts bargaining power to the low-valuation spouse, the probability of 
children’s private school attendance may decline.   
A growing empirical literature documents an increase in spending on and investment in 
children when women (primarily mothers) have greater control over household expenditures 
(Thomas 1990; Phipps and Burton 1998; Duflo 2003; Maitra 2003; Ward-Batts 2008).  If joint-
custody reform shifts bargaining power to fathers, who are, on average, the low-valuation 
spouse, Rasul’s (2006) model predicts an unambiguous decline in marital investment in 
children.
13
  
 
C. Joint Custody, Property Division, and Household Bargaining 
It is likely that the effects of joint-custody laws on marital investment in children are predicated 
on the underlying property-division laws, which may benefit either fathers or mothers in the 
event of divorce.  In divorce settlements, Gray (1998) contends that men benefit more in 
common-law states, and women benefit more in community-property states.  In common-law 
states that enact joint custody, fathers may have additional incentive to invest in assets because 
the corresponding return is higher relative to child investment.
14
  Mothers in common-law states 
may have less incentive to invest in children because joint-custody reform lowers their expected 
return from investment in child quality.  Alternatively, mothers in these states may have 
                                                 
13
 However, Blundell et al. (2005) argue that changes in household investment in children resulting from an 
increase (decrease) in individual resources may not be the result of differences between fathers’ and mothers’ 
willingness to pay but rather the responsiveness of mothers’ and fathers’ willingness to pay to changes in private 
consumption.  
14
 Under a joint-custody regime, fathers may expect a larger share of child custody in the event of divorce.  This 
could result in lower paternal investment in children, in which that investment was previously directed toward 
binding the marriage so as not to lose time with children.  Under these circumstances, a law change which grants 
more custody to fathers in states with property-division laws favoring them would likely increase the relative return 
to investment in marital assets. 
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additional incentive to invest in children to further bind their marriages rather than incur a loss of 
both assets and child custody.   
Fathers in community-property states that enact joint custody may be more likely to send 
their children to private school because they will reap more benefits from child investment 
relative to their return on marital assets.  Alternatively, joint-custody reform in community-
property states could lower the return on child investment for mothers relative to the return on 
marital assets, as they may expect less time with their children after divorce.  
In equitable-division states that adopt joint custody, the ways in which bargaining power 
shifts are less clear.  Judges in these states are given discretion to rule as they see fit.  However, 
equitable-division-property laws typically favor the spouse who is damaged the most by the 
divorce (Gray 1998).  Weitzman (1985) and Hoffman and Duncan (1988) find that the economic 
well-being of divorced women falls by 73 percent and 30 percent, respectively.  Assuming a 
decline in the well-being of women following divorce, equitable-division property laws tend to 
favor mothers.  If joint-custody reform shifts bargaining power to fathers, children’s private 
school attendance may increase in states with equitable-division property because fathers expect 
a greater return on child investment relative to the returns from assets.  Mothers may have 
additional incentive to invest in assets, as the expected return on child investment declines.  
However, in equitable-division states, parents may not change their investment behavior in 
marital assets or children’s schooling because courts are expected to divide marital property 
evenly between spouses.   
 
III. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
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We use data from the 1980 and 1990 five-percent Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
(IPUMS) from the U.S. Population Censuses and the child-custody-law coding from Brinig and 
Buckley (1998a, see TABLE 1) to determine whether the prospect of joint custody affects within-
marriage investment in children.  The units of observation are children whose biological parents 
are married at the survey date.  We exclude children from blended families because child-
investment decisions would likely be made by biological parents, one of whom is absent.  The 
sample is also restricted by the categorical nature of the education variable provided by the 
IPUMS.  The survey collapses children who are in kindergarten and those who are not enrolled 
in school in the same category.  As such, we are unable to examine children in grades lower than 
first.  
We use children’s private school attendance as a measure of child investment for two 
reasons: (i) it is verifiable, and (ii) it is commonly used in the literature (e.g., see Cáceres-
Delpiano 2006; Conley and Glauber 2006).  One potential problem with using children’s private-
school education as a measure of child investment is the long-run planning of parents, as they 
could decide on private school before their children are of school age.  Estimates of joint-custody 
reform’s effect on marital investment in children may be biased if parents make child-investment 
decisions prior to the law change.  We minimize this potential bias by eliminating observations 
from states that enact joint custody after 1983 so the oldest and the younger children in our 
sample in 1990 were one-year-old and unborn at the time of the last enactment, respectively.
15
  
This restriction also accounts for the greater influence of older children, relative to younger 
children, on the schooling decisions made by parents.   
                                                 
15
  This restriction results in the elimination of observations from Illinois, Maryland, Oregon, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.   
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The median marriage duration in which divorce occurs is approximately eight years (U.S. 
Census 2004).
16
  This is important, as those who are considering divorce (i.e. those on the 
margin) are more likely to be aware of how states allocate children in the event of divorce.  
Although we cannot determine how long the couples in our sample have been married, the ages 
of children can aid in approximating length of marriage.  Because we consider married couples 
with children aged four to eight years, the sample likely contains intact households with many 
different marriage durations.
17
   
Variation in the timing of joint-custody reforms across states provides a natural experiment 
framework with which to examine how the prospect of joint custody affects within-marriage 
investment in children.  Natural experiments require treatment and comparison groups.  Married 
couples with children who live in states that change their child-custody laws to favor joint 
custody between 1980 and 1990 are the treatment group, while those who live in states that had 
either instituted joint-custody reform before 1980 or that did not adopt joint-custody laws before 
1990 are the comparison group.  Between 1980 and 1983, 21 of the 42 states in our sample 
adopted a preference for joint-custody arrangements.  This provides substantial variation in the 
population who are affected by child-custody reform.  In 1980, 32 percent of children in our 
sample (observations = 148,714) live in states with joint custody as the preferred custodial 
allocation, while the percentage of children who live in states with joint custody as the preferred 
                                                 
16
 See http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/marr-div/2004detailed_tables.html.   
17
 Consider the oldest children in our sample: those who are eight-years-old at the survey date.  Assuming the 
couple had the child in their first year of marriage, their marriage duration is eight years as of the survey date.  
However, married couples could postpone having children for a few years.  This implies marriage durations in 
excess of eight years.  Parents could also be married a shorter time, as the child could have been born out of 
wedlock.  As such, the sample likely contains a sufficient number of at-risk marriages—those who would be aware 
of how the states in which they live allocate children in the event of divorce. 
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option in 1990 is 84 percent (observations = 159,008).  Approximately 14 percent of children in 
our sample attend private school, regardless of the custodial regime in place.
18
    
The 1980 and 1990 U.S. Censuses provide a way to control for child and parent 
characteristics and time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the state level.  However, omitted 
time-varying, state-specific variables correlated with the passage of joint custody and children’s 
private school attendance could bias estimates.
19
  For example, child custody was at the forefront 
of legislative agendas in the late-1970s and early-1980s because increased welfare receipts were 
attributed to delinquent child-support payments (Jacob 1988, Ch. 8).  The spread of joint-custody 
reform could also be related to changing societal preferences for child-rearing responsibilities, as 
rising female labor-force participation rates and fathers’ increasing role in child rearing provided 
fathers’ rights groups with a political voice to argue for joint custody (Jacob 1988, Ch. 8).  
Reforms to the child-support-enforcement (CSE) program, participation in and the benefit levels 
of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and the female labor-force 
participation rate are likely correlated with the passage of joint custody.  These variables could 
also be correlated with children’s private school attendance.  Failure to account for these 
covariates could lead to biased estimates. 
The empirical specification takes the probit functional form.  We estimate the following 
equation: 
, , 0 1 , 2 , , 3 , , 4 , , ,i s t s t i s t i s t s t s t i s ts t
Private Joint C P S  (1) 
                                                 
18
  According to the 2000 U.S. Census (Table 247) approximately 2.7 million children (9.2 percent of the total 
population of elementary school students) attended private elementary school in 1990.  Although our sample 
suggests a higher percentage of children attending private school, the difference likely comes from our sample 
consisting of only intact households with own children present.  
19
 Stevenson (2008) finds that Gray’s (1998) results are sensitive to the inclusion of time-varying, state-level 
controls.     
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The terms i, s, and t index children, states, and time, respectively.  Private is an indicator 
variable that equals one if a child attends private school and equals zero if the child attends 
public school;
20
 Joint is an indicator variable that equals one if a state explicitly codifies or 
reveals its preference for joint custody in any year prior to the 1990 Census year and zero 
otherwise; C is a vector of child-specific controls; P is a vector of parental controls;  S is a vector 
of time-varying, state-level controls;  and   are state and time fixed effects, respectively; ε is an 
error term; and the i  are parameters to be estimated.
21
   
The variables in C are the child’s age, a squared term of their age, race, gender, and whether 
they live in a city, and those in P are parents’ ages, races, and education levels.  The variables in 
S include the unemployment rate, real per-capita income, the female labor-force participation 
rate, a measure of the extent to which a state’s congressional delegation cast liberal votes, an 
indicator variable for the political party of the governor, the consideration of marital fault in the 
divorce settlement, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) participation rate and 
maximum benefit paid to families of four, the value of food-stamp outlays, the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) participation rate, and whether states universally withhold child-support 
payments from father paychecks.
22
  The inclusion of S allows us to minimize the potential bias 
                                                 
20
 We are unable to distinguish between various religious or parochial private schools because the U.S. 
Population Census survey questions on school type are not consistent across the two decennial periods.     
21
 In order to estimate the full effect of joint-custody reform, we do not control for covariates that may be 
affected by the reform, which is similar to the approach used by Stevenson (2007).  For example, household income 
could be affected by the adoption of joint custody because the reform may change spousal labor-supply decisions.  
Because the reform may change investments in children, it could also alter fertility decisions.  If the reform affects 
household income and/or the number of children, then at least a portion of the effect of the joint-custody laws on 
children’s private school attendance would be removed, because its impact would also be captured in the estimates 
for household income and/or the number of children (Lee 2005). However, we checked the sensitivity of the 
estimates to controls for household income and family size. These models reveal little difference in the estimated 
effects of joint-custody reform on children’s private school attendance.  In fact, the inclusion of these covariates 
tends to strengthen our findings.     
22
 There were a large number of child-support-enforcement (CSE) reforms that occurred concomitantly with the 
adoption of joint custody.  We only control for those CSE variables that potentially affect married couples, as the 
bulk of CSE reforms and expenditures were directed at the increasing the child-support receipt of never-married 
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from a spurious correlation between joint-custody reform and other state-level influences.
23
  
Summary statistics and formal variable definitions for the controls in C and P are shown in 
TABLE 2, and those in S are shown in TABLE 3.  
We also examine the potential tradeoff between child investment and other marriage-specific 
assets by allowing joint-custody reform to have asymmetric effects across three mutually 
exclusive property-division regimes: common law, equitable division, and community property.24 
We use Gray’s (1998) property-division law coding found in TABLE 1.  Because there is limited 
variation in joint-custody reform among states with certain property-division laws, the estimated 
interaction effects are more likely to capture a spurious relationship between time-varying, state-
level variables and child-custody reform.  This may not present a problem for the estimated 
effect of joint-custody reform in equitable-division states, as 13 of the 28 equitable-division 
states enact joint custody between 1980 and 1984.  However, of the 14 common-law states and 
the eight community-property states, only four in each type of state enact joint custody between 
1980 and 1984.  Identification of these effects also relies on the variables in S to control for 
state-level changes correlated with the passage of joint custody and/or the underlying property-
division laws and children’s private school attendance.   
The equation testing the potential tradeoff between investment in children and other marital 
assets is  
                                                                                                                                                             
mothers. Another reason to omit these variables from the model is the substantial collinearity between them and 
joint-custody reform.    
23
 Controls for the underlying property-division laws and the adoption of unilateral divorce laws, which could 
be correlated with joint-custody reform, are captured as state fixed effects.  Only South Dakota and Utah changed 
their divorce laws to favor unilateral divorce between 1980 and 1990 (See Gruber 2004).  Both South Dakota and 
Utah also began to favor joint custody in 1987; therefore, these states are excluded because of our experimental 
design.   
24
 Previous studies have also considered the effects of changes in family laws by whether states consider marital 
fault in the divorce settlement (e.g., see Gray 1998; Stevenson 2007). We checked the robustness of joint-custody 
reform’s effects on marital investment in children, and our results are largely robust across no-fault and fault-based 
property-division states.  
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We define the terms i, s, and t and variables Private, C, P, S, , , and ε above.  The variables 
Joint with Community, Joint with Common, and Joint with Equitable equal one when 
community-property, common-law, and equitable-division states adopt joint custody and zero 
otherwise, respectively.   The i  are parameters to be estimated.     
In our last set of models, we partition the sample by mothers’ education, a measure of SES.25  
We then reestimate equations (1) and (2) separately for three SES groups: mothers who are high 
school dropouts, mothers who are high-school graduates and those who have attended some 
college, and mothers who are college graduates.  We partition the sample by SES for several 
reasons.  First, parental decisions to send children to private school are likely determined by 
SES.  Second, divorced couples who are of high SES are more likely to receive joint-custody 
arrangements (Seltzer 1991).  Third, divorce propensities differ by SES, with the lower-SES 
group having higher divorce propensities than higher-SES groups (Weiss and Willis 1997).  
Fourth, partitioning by mothers’ education may provide a clearer picture of household 
bargaining, as the gain in bargaining power received by fathers following joint-custody reform 
could be mitigated by mothers’ education.  Fifth, joint-custody reform could lead to 
improvements in the bargaining position of mothers who are of high-SES. Sharing child custody 
with a former spouse could allow mothers to pursue professional careers, as fathers would likely 
participate in child rearing. It is well documented that women, including mothers, increasingly 
pursued professional careers over the sample period (Goldin 2006; Goldin et al. 2006).     
                                                 
25
 We use mother’s educational attainment as a measure of SES because household income is a likely 
endogenous variable.    
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Comparison of the sample’s descriptive statistics suggests that children’s private school 
attendance varies greatly by mother’s education: seven percent for those whose mothers are high 
school dropouts; 13 percent for those whose mothers are high school graduates or have attended 
some college; and 19 percent for those whose mothers are college graduates.  We compare 
descriptive statistics on children’s private school attendance by mother’s education in states with 
and without joint-custody laws in TABLE 4.  Children’s private school attendance is greater in 
joint-custody states relative to sole-custody states for children in the highest-SES group, those 
whose mothers are college graduates.  By contrast, private school attendance for children is 
lower in joint-custody states relative to sole-custody states for the lower-SES groups.   
 
IV. RESULTS 
A. Joint Custody, Property Division, and Child Investment 
TABLE 5 shows the estimates from equations (1) and (2) for the full sample of children.  Model 1 
shows the results from the baseline model, which considers the effect of joint-custody reform on 
within-marriage investment in children’s private-school education (i.e. Equation (1)).  We find a 
13 percent (1.7 percentage point) decline in the probability of children’s private school 
attendance in states that adopt joint custody between 1980 and 1990.  This estimated effect is 
statistically significant at the one-percent level.     
The negative effect found for joint-custody reform’s effect on within-marriage investment in 
children’s private-school education rejects the common-preference model posited by Becker 
(1991), but it provides support for the predictions made by cooperative bargaining models and 
collective models of household behavior (e.g., see Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and 
Horney 1981; Chiappori 1992; Blundel et al. 2005).  In addition, our result is consistent with 
existing empirical research on policies that benefit one spouse over the other.  This literature 
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shows that when women have a greater bargaining position within marriage spending on children 
increases relative to when men have more control over the  resources (e.g., see Thomas 1990; 
Lundberg et al. 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998; Gitter and Barham 2008; Ward-Batts 2008).  The 
model posited by Rasul (2006) also provides support for our findings, who suggests that within-
marriage investment in child quality is driven by the preferences parents for child investment and 
their relative bargaining position within marriage.  Our finding is also consistent with a 
prediction made by Rasul’s model: if parents have heterogeneous valuations of child quality, a 
shift in bargaining power to the low-valuation parent unambiguously leads to a decline in within-
marriage investment in child quality.  Rasul’s model also shows that when parents have an 
equally low valuation of investment in child quality, investment in the public good (i.e. children) 
declines.  However, this should be the case regardless of whether states adopt joint-custody laws.  
In the context of Rasul (2006) and the existing literature, it could be that joint-custody reform 
shifts bargaining power to the low-valuation parent; in this case, the father.   
Model 2 shows the estimates from equation (2).  This specification considers the effects on 
the probability of children’s private school attendance of joint-custody reform by the type of 
property-division law in place across states.  This model tests for a tradeoff between investment 
in children and other marital assets.
26
  The effects of joint-custody reform in both common-law 
and community-property states are negative and statistically significant at the one-percent level.  
In these states, the probability of children’s private school attendance declines by 20 and 23 
percent (2.6 and 3.0 percentage points), respectively.  The estimated effect of joint-custody 
                                                 
26
 It is unlikely that the estimated effects of joint-custody reform by the type of property-division laws in place 
across states would reflect a substitution toward consumption of nondurable goods, because these goods are not 
subject to property division.  However, the division of durable goods (e.g., cars, boats, homes, and other marital 
assets) is subject to the underlying property-division laws. As such, any difference in the probability of attending 
private school for children in states with certain property-division laws that adopt joint custody likely reflects a 
substitution of resources to investment in marital assets rather than consumption.  
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reform in equitable-division states is negative, but it is not statistically different from zero.  As 
such, the overall effect of joint-custody reform shown for equation (1) appears to be present only 
in states that have property-division laws that consistently favor one spouse over the other.  
Because men benefit in common-law states and women benefit in community-property 
states, the sizeable, negative effects found in these states suggest that spouses invest more in 
marital assets relative to children’s schooling when they stand to receive a greater share of the 
marital assets following divorce.  The results for joint-custody reform in common-law states 
supports the idea that bargaining power shifts to the low-valuation parent, perhaps fathers.  In 
these states, fathers benefit both in terms of child custody and the portion of the marital surplus 
procured after divorce.  As a result, the relative post-divorce return on marital assets may be 
higher than the returns from child investment for fathers.  In addition, it could be that when 
women can take a larger share of the marital assets they prefer to invest in assets rather than 
child quality.  As for the effect of joint-custody reform in equitable-division states, parents may 
not change their investment behavior in marital assets or children’s schooling because property 
division is determined by courts, which likely have different preferences for the allocation of 
marital property following divorce.  As such, it may be difficult for parents to forecast accurately 
how marital property will be divided.  
 
B. Joint Custody, Property Division, Socioeconomic Status, and Child Investment 
TABLE 6 presents estimates from equations (1) and (2) for subsamples partitioned by SES.  
Models 1 and 2 present the results for children whose mothers are high-school dropouts (low 
SES); Models 4 and 5 present the results for children whose mothers are high-school graduates 
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or have attended some college (mid SES); and Models 7 and 8 present the results for children 
whose mothers have graduated from college (high SES).   
For children whose mothers are high-school dropouts, the impact of joint-custody reform on 
children’s private school attendance is negative and statistically significant at the one-percent 
level in Model 1.  This estimated effect translates into a 32 percent decrease (2.3 percentage 
points) in the probability of children’s private school attendance.  In Model 2, we investigate the 
impact of joint-custody reform by the underlying property-division regime in place across states 
on the probability of private school attendance for children.  These effects translate into 74, 35, 
and 38 percent decreases (5.8, 1.6, and 2.5 percentage points) in community-property, common-
law, and equitable-division states, respectively.  The results from Models 1 and 2 for the lowest 
SES group indicate that joint-custody reform negatively affects the probability of children’s 
private school attendance regardless of how the state divides marital property. 
Model 3 indicates that joint-custody reform is negative and statistically significant at 
conventional levels for the mid-SES group.  This effect translates into a seven percent (one 
percentage point) decrease in the probability of children’s private school attendance.  Similar to 
the results for the full sample, Model 4 indicates that the negative effects of joint-custody reform 
are larger in community-property and common-law states.  In these states that enact joint 
custody, the probability of children’s private school attendance declines by 22 and 17 percent 
(2.8 and 2.1 percentage points), respectively.  Joint-custody reform in equitable-division states is 
not statistically different from zero for the mid-SES group.   
For the highest-SES group, we find that the effect of joint-custody reform on the probability 
of children’s private school attendance is negative and statistically significant at the five percent 
level in Model 5.  This effect translates into a 10 percent (2.1 percentage point) decrease in the 
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probability of children’s private school attendance.  In Model 6, we find an 11 percent (2.2 
percentage point) increase in the probability of children’s private school attendance in 
community-property states that enact joint custody.  By contrast, we find a 19 percent (3.8 
percentage point) decline in the probability of children’s private school attendance in common-
law states that enact joint custody.  The effect of joint-custody reform in equitable-division states 
is not statistically different from zero, which is similar to the estimates presented for the full 
sample and the mid-SES group.  
Children from the lowest-SES households are more adversely and robustly affected by joint-
custody reform than those from higher-SES groups.  There are a number of potential reasons for 
the larger negative effects of joint-custody reform on children from the lowest-SES group.  First, 
the lowest-SES group faces a higher probability of divorce. As such, they would be more likely 
to be affected by the reform.  Second, low-SES families could have lower valuations of child 
quality on average.  Third, because of positive assortative mating based on education, mothers 
from the lowest-SES group may have worse outside options.  If the value of outside options is 
lower, they would be in an even worse bargaining position following custody reform.  As a 
result, the preferences of fathers for investment in child quality may be reflected to a greater 
extent.   
The effects of joint-custody reform without conditioning on the type of property-division 
regime in place are similar for the mid- and high-SES groups.  However, the effects differ when 
the underlying property-division laws are considered in conjunction with joint-custody reform: 
the effect of joint-custody reform in community-property states is negative for the mid-SES 
group, while it is positive for the high-SES group.  A potential explanation for the positive effect 
of joint-custody reform in community-property states could be that women who are of high SES, 
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on average, exhibit more bargaining power within marriage.  If women are more altruistic toward 
their children, enactment of joint custody in community-property states in conjunction with their 
higher education attainment appears to eliminate the gain in bargaining power received by 
fathers.  Alternatively, if fathers receive additional bargaining power following joint-custody 
reform but women retain a greater share of marital property, fathers may invest more in child 
quality because they stand to lose a larger share of the marital assets relative to the returns from 
child investment.  Likewise, it could be that bargaining power shifts to mothers in the high-SES 
group.  They may wish to invest more in child quality to compensate for the time they spend 
pursuing professional careers.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We investigate the effects of joint- or shared-child-custody laws on marriage-specific investment 
in child quality.  We use variation in the timing of child-custody reforms across states to identify 
the effects of joint-custody reform on children’s private school attendance.  Although most 
children in the U.S. do not attend private school, observed differences in private school 
attendance can likely be generalized to other forms of child investment.  We find a statistically 
significant, 13 percent decrease in the probability that a child attends private school in states that 
enact joint custody.   
We interpret these results in context of recent literature on government programs which 
target financial transfers to specific family members, primarily women.  States that move from a 
maternal-preference regime to a joint-custody regime decrease the bargaining power of mothers 
in married households.  As a result, marital investment in children may reflect the preferences of 
fathers to a greater extent.  Consistent with previous literature on intrahousehold distribution 
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(e.g., Thomas 1990; Lundberg et al. 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998; Maitra 2003; Ward-Batts 
2008), we find a decrease in child-specific investment after joint-custody enactment.  
We also consider the potential tradeoff for married couples between investing in marital 
assets and child quality.  In both community-property and common-law states that enact joint 
custody, the probability of children’s private school attendance declines by 20 and 23 percent, 
respectively.  An economic explanation of these sizable, negative effects could be that spouses 
invest less in their children when they stand to gain more of the marital assets in the event of 
divorce.   
Dividing the sample by SES for these models yields many interesting results.  For the lowest 
SES group, we observe a decrease in the probability of children’s private school attendance 
regardless of the underlying property-division laws in states that enact joint custody.  In 
common-law states, joint-custody reform reduces the probability of children’s private school 
attendance for all SES groups.  However, joint-custody reform in community property states 
increases the probability a child attends private school for the high SES group, which may reflect 
an increase in bargaining power for more educated women.  
Judges in the U.S. are directed to consider the best interests of the child in the adjudication of 
child-custody cases.  To that end, joint-custody reform may lessen the impact on children of 
losing regular contact with one of their parents.  However, the prospect of post-divorce 
cooperation under a joint-custody regime may have negative, within-marriage consequences 
regarding child investment.  The incentives to invest in children and other marital assets could be 
predicated on the potential return to those investments in the event of divorce.  According to our 
results, the effect of joint-custody reform on marital investment in children also depends on state 
laws specifying the division of marital assets.  Further consideration of how joint-custody laws 
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alter child-investment incentives within married households could help avoid negative, albeit 
unintended, consequences for children. 
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TABLE 1—YEAR OF INTRODUCTION OF JOINT-CUSTODY LAWS 
AND THE PREVAILING PROPERTY-DIVISION LAWS BY STATE 
      
State 
Joint 
Custody 
Property 
Division 
State 
Joint 
Custody 
Property 
Division 
      
      
Alabama   Common Montana 1981 Equitable 
Alaska 1982 Equitable Nebraska 1983 Equitable 
Arizona 1991 Community Nevada 1981 Community 
Arkansas  Equitable New Hampshire 1974 Equitable 
California 1979 Community New Jersey 1981 Equitable 
Colorado 1983 Equitable New Mexico 1982 Community 
Connecticut 1981 Equitable New York 1981 Common 
Delaware 1981 Equitable North Carolina 1979 Common 
Florida 1979 Common North Dakota 1993 Equitable 
Georgia 1990 Common Ohio 1981 Common 
Hawaii 1980 Equitable Oklahoma 1990 Equitable 
Idaho 1982 Community Oregon 1987 Equitable 
Illinois 1986 Equitable Pennsylvania 1981 Common 
Indiana 1973 Equitable Rhode Island 1992 Common 
Iowa 1977 Equitable South Carolina  Common 
Kansas 1979 Equitable South Dakota 1989 Equitable 
Kentucky 1979 Equitable Tennessee 1986 Common 
Louisiana 1981 Community Texas 1987 Community 
Maine 1981 Equitable Utah 1988 Equitable 
Maryland 1984 Common Vermont 1992 Equitable 
Massachusetts 1983 Equitable Virginia 1987 Common 
Michigan 1981 Equitable Washington  Community 
Minnesota 1981 Equitable West Virginia  Common 
Mississippi 1983 Common Wisconsin  1979 Equitable 
Missouri 1983 Equitable Wyoming 1993 Equitable 
      
Notes: The timing of the child-custody reforms are from Brinig and Buckley (1998a), and the coding for the 
underlying property-division laws are from Gray (1998). 
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TABLE 2—SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CHILD, MOTHER, AND FATHER  CONTROLS 
Variable Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
    
Outcome Variable:    
Private  =1 if child attends private school 0.1340 0.3341 
    
Child Covariates:    
Gender =1 if child is a male 0.5004 0.5000 
Hispanic =1 if child is Hispanic 0.0911 0.2878 
Black =1 if child is black 0.0754 0.2641 
City =1 if child lives in a city 0.1331 0.3397 
    
Mother Covariates:    
Age In years 31.014 5.3260 
Hispanic =1 if mother is Hispanic 0.0872 0.2822 
Black =1 if mother is black  0.0732 0.2605 
High School =1 if mother has only a high-school degree 0.4291 0.4949 
Some College =1 if mother has attended college with no degree 0.2422 0.4284 
College Graduate =1 if mother is a college graduate 0.1572 0.3640 
    
Father Covariates:    
Age In years 36.660 6.3622 
Hispanic  =1 if father is Hispanic 0.0868 0.2816 
Black  =1 if father is black  0.0760 0.2650 
High School =1 if father has only a high-school degree 0.3506 0.4772 
Some College =1 if father has attended college with no degree 0.2382 0.4260 
College Graduate =1 if father is a college graduate 0.2364 0.4249 
    
Notes:  There are 307,722 observations for all variables.  All children are aged four to eight years.   
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TABLE 3—SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR TIME-VARYING STATE-LEVEL VARIABLES 
Variable Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
    
Unemployment Rate Percentage of the population unemployed who is searching for employment 6.4349 1.5672 
Per Capita Income Average real personal income 14,679 5,149 
Liberal Quotient (House) The degree to which states’ House of Representatives cast liberal votes  0.4932 0.1599 
Liberal Quotient (Senate) The degree to which states’ Senate cast liberal votes 0.5195 0.2393 
Governor =1 if the governor is a Democrat 0.5923 0.4914 
No-Fault Property =1 if the state removes marital fault from consideration in the divorce settlement 0.4213 0.4938 
AFDC Benefit Dollar amount of the maximum AFDC benefit paid to families of four 576.65 218.65 
AFDC Participation AFDC participation rate 12.069 3.4964 
Food Stamp Value Dollar amount of Food-Stamp outlays 588.67 410.82 
Social Security Rate Supplemental Security Income participation rate 1.9502 0.8144 
FLFPR Female labor-force participation rate 54.240 4.7053 
Universal Withholding =1 if state withholds child-support awards from nonresidential parents’ earnings 0.2327 0.4225 
    
Notes:  There are 307,722 observations for all variables.  All variables in dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation.  The state-level Demographic variables come 
from the United States (U.S.) Census and the Center for Disease Control (CDC): http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1980s/, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/, and http://wonder.cdc.gov/Census.html.  The state-level Economic variables come from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) and www.economagic.com: http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/sec13.pdf and http://www.economagic.com/beapira.htm.  The state-
level Political variables come from http://www.adaction.org/votingrecords.htm  and World Almanacs.  The state-level, Welfare Policy variables come from 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicators07/apa.pdf and the Department of Health and Human Services.  The variable Universal Withholding is from Huang (2002).   
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TABLE 4—SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CHILDREN’S PRIVATE SCHOOL 
ATTENDANCE BY MOTHER’S EDUCATION AND JOINT-CUSTODY REGIME 
Mother’s Education 
Joint Custody=0     Joint Custody=1 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. 
       
High School  
    Dropouts 
0.0847 0.2785 22,922 0.0652 0.2469 29,861 
       
High School Graduates  
    and Some College 
0.1443 0.3514 130,813 0.1362 0.3481 150,283 
       
College  
    Graduates 
0.1840 0.3878 15,597 0.2036 0.4027 32,779 
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TABLE 5—THE EFFECTS OF JOINT-CUSTODY REFORM  
ON CHILDREN’S PRIVATE SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 
Variable Model 1 Model 2  
    
Baseline Model:    
Joint-Custody Reform 
-0.0171*** 
     --  
(0.0044) 
    
By Property Division:    
    
Joint-Custody Reform with Community Property       -- 
-0.0258*** 
 
(0.0039) 
    
Joint-Custody Reform with Common Law       -- 
-0.0299*** 
 
(0.0029) 
    
Joint-Custody Reform with Equitable Division       -- 
-0.0007 
 
(0.0042) 
    
Notes: There are 307,722 observations for each model. Estimates are reported as marginal effects. Standard 
errors clustered at the state-year level and are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively. All models include child and parent characteristics, 
state and time fixed effects, and time-varying state-level variables as controls.  
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TABLE 6— CHILD-CUSTODY LAWS, PROPERTY-DIVISION LAWS, AND MARRIED COUPLES’  
INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN’S PRIVATE SCHOOL BY MOTHERS’ EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
    
 High School Dropout 
High School Graduate 
and Some College 
College Graduate 
Variable       
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Baseline Model:       
       
Joint-Custody Reform 
-0.0226*** 
     -- 
-0.0091** 
     -- 
-0.0206** 
     -- 
(0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0092) 
       
By Property Division:       
       
Joint-Custody Reform with 
 Community Property 
     -- 
-0.0576*** 
     -- 
-0.0280*** 
     -- 
 0.0216** 
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0109) 
       
Joint-Custody Reform with 
 Common Law  
     -- 
-0.0159*** 
     -- 
-0.0214*** 
     -- 
-0.0378*** 
(0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0083) 
       
Joint-Custody Reform with 
 Equitable Division  
     -- 
-0.0246*** 
     -- 
 0.0059 
     -- 
 0.0125 
(0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0098) 
       
Number of Observations 52,783 52,783 206,563 206,563 48,376 48,376 
       
Notes: Estimates are reported as marginal effects. Standard errors clustered at the state-year level and are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.  All models include child and parent characteristics state and time fixed effects, and a set of 
time-varying, state-level variables as controls.   
 
